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EVERYONE COMPLAINS ABOUT THE WEATHER, BUT No
ONE EVER DOES ANYTHING ABOUT IT:
INTERJURISDICTIONAL FAILURE TO DESIGNATE
RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS
FEDERICO CHEEVERt
INTRODUCTION
The evolving response to the approaching climate crisis challenges
the assumptions on which many groups of policymakers rely to make
sense of the world around them. It has dramatically broadened our no-
tion of what constitutes an environmentally significant transaction. It has
altered our view of the relationship between developed and developing
countries.' It shows every sign of transforming our notions of interna-
tional governance and, within the United States, our ideas of federalism.
2
In biodiversity preservation, it has called into question the "reserve sys-
tem strategy," which has been-without question-the dominant ap-
proach to preservation for decades. 3 It may alter our understanding of
the meaning ofjustice. The whole thing makes us dizzy.
t Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Den-
ver University Law Review, particularly Erik Lemmon, Editor-in-Chief. I would also like to thank
my research assistant Dulcinea Hanuschak without whom this essay would have been impossible.
I. Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change-The New "Superwhale" in the Room: Interna-
tional Whaling and Climate Change Politics-Too Much in Common?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 767-
70 (2007) (discussing the refusal of major greenhouse gas emitters-the developed U.S. and the
rapidly developing China and India-to embrace emissions restrictions, unlike many European
countries); Paul G. Harris, The European Union and Environmental Change: Sharing the Burdens
of Global Warming, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 309, 315-19 (2006) (discussing develop-
ing countries' desire to be treated as equals with developed countries during international climate
change negotiations, and the philosophical differences in how developed and developing countries
view the greenhouse gas problem: that is, that developed countries see it as an environmental prob-
lem while developing countries see it as a human-welfare concern).
2. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 159, 177-81 (2006) (opining that an effective means of addressing climate change is
to maintain "overlapping" state and federal jurisdiction over environmental issues); Kirsten H.
Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The
Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999) (explaining that state market-based
environmental regulations could potentially result in Commerce Clause violations and suggesting
means by which states may be able to carry out efficient market-based environmental regulations
without risking constitutional violations); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:
Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 359, 367-69 (1997) (discuss-
ing the need for some form of federal environmental regulation in order to avoid the tendency of
some states to impose relaxed environmental standards so as to increase their competitive edge in
interstate industry).
3. See generally CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY (Thomas E. Lovejoy & Lee Hannah
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2006) (describing climate change biology in light of social concerns, conser-
vation, and public policy); Cornelia Dean, The Preservation Predicament, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2008, at Fl ("Conservation organizations that work to preserve biologically rich landscapes are
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Lawyers, as a profession, have been particularly disoriented by this
dramatic change in the shape of the projected future. Our traditional
skills seem quaint in a world of impending global cataclysm and pro-
spective gee-whiz technology. Faced with the unknown we are, as al-
ways, prisoners of popular culture. Lawyers-as lawyers-never play a
significant role in disaster movies. The best we have ever been able to
hope for in the face of an asteroid strike, alien epidemic, or monster from
the deep is the authority that comes from the fact that most elected offi-
cials are lawyers.4 Legal skills have never seemed important when the
fictional President or Prime Minister decides to evacuate New York or
calls out the army to stop Godzilla. This image of lawyers in times of
fictitious disaster has shaped the legal academic response to the real cli-
mate crisis: We exercise our judgment, playing economist,5 social scien-
tist,6 moral philosopher,7 atmospheric scientist, 8 or all four, as we con-
sider what to do, but we do not "lawyer."
However, lawyers-as lawyers-are central to fashioning a re-
sponse to the climate crisis not only for our judgment and ability to give
inspiring speeches in times of crisis but also for our traditional legal hab-
its of mind. When we, as lawyers, face a new threat or cost that society
will bear we endeavor to: (1) identify responsible parties to bear that
cost; (2) identify mechanisms to spread that cost equitably among those
responsible parties; and (3) identify measures to reduce that cost to the
confronting a painful realization: In an era of climate change, many of their efforts may be insuffi-
cient or beside the point.").
4. LEE HANNAH ET AL., BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN CONTEXT, CLIMATE
CHANGE AND BIOD1VERSITY 3, 7-13 (Thomas E. Lovejoy & Lee Hannah, eds., Yale Univ. Press
2005); Dean, supra note 3, at F1.
5. E.g., Ari Bessendorf, Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimensions in Climate
Change, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 325, 347-49 (2005) (describing the problem of green-
house gas emissions in terms of market systems and game theory).
6. E.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Re-
gional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 60-62 (2005) (opining that while state efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions appear irrational when examined under standard economic theory, other
motivations have nonetheless caused some state and local governments to take action to reduce
emissions).
7. Eg, Mary Christina Wood, Keynote Address: Government's Atmospheric Trust Respon-
sibility, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369 (2007) (opining that the government has a moral trust respon-
sibility to protect the environment from a "climate emergency"); Mary Christina Wood, Nature's
Trust: A Legal, Political and Moral Frame for Global Warming, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 577,
598, 603 (2007) (discussing the seriousness of global warming and suggesting that the government
has a moral obligation to protect the environment).
8. E.g., William C. Bums, Global Warming-The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y 147, 150-66
(1997) (discussing the scientific causes of global climate change and the validity of computerized
climate models for forecasting the effects of climate change); William C. Burns, The Second Session
of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
More Heat than Light?, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 153, 154-56 (1997) (discussing the
scientific basis for the greenhouse effect).
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degree possible. On items two and three, we are wise to work with ex-
perts in other disciplines. On item one, we tend to ride alone. 9
To date, the legal debate regarding climate change has been driven
largely by items two and three in the list above: the search for mecha-
nisms to spread costs among responsible parties and measures to mitigate
those costs. It has deemphasized, most remarkably at the federal level
and the international level, the identification of responsible parties.
The identification of responsible parties, however, is an essential
first step toward any workable legal mechanism. Both the processes of
identifying mechanisms to spread cost and measures to reduce cost de-
pend, to a significant degree, on identifying who is responsible, why they
are responsible, and what they can do about it.
Professor Daniel Farber initiated a related inquiry in his 2007 article
Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change.10 However, his
preliminary discussion focused primarily on using existing liability doc-
trines as tools for providing compensation for the victims of the climate
crisis. In contrast, I suspect that the unprecedented nature of the crisis
will force the evolution of unique theories of responsibility, whatever
traditional labels we endeavor to affix to them. Without a doubt, legisla-
tures (international, national, and intra-national), will play an essential
role in shaping the structure of responsibility. Courts undoubtedly will
play a role as well. They will engage in a complex dance that defies easy
prediction.
As Professor Farber observes, "[t]he tort system-and, by exten-
sion, other compensation schemes-has several goals. Probably the two
most important are deterring harmful conduct (the efficiency or deter-
rence rationale) and corrective justice (that is, restoring moral balance by
rectifying harm)."" These policy considerations extend beyond compen-
sation schemes to any structure of responsibility. Questions of "deter-
rence" and "corrective justice" cannot be answered without identifying
responsible parties.
Still, there is a temptation to treat climate change as "the weather":
to treat climate change as something which is no one's responsibility
and, therefore, to treat its consequent costs-be they costs of prevention
or adaptation-as something we should all bear equally. In fact, the re-
sponsibility for the climate crisis does not fall equally on all entities in
society and we should not pretend that it does. Some entities have
9. See Palsgraff v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that a party
is not liable for negligence unless damage was caused by a reasonably foreseeable risk).
10. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 1605 (2007).
11. Id. at 1640.
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gained far more from the creation of the current crisis than most of us.
Some entities have far more power to stop or limit it.
This temptation to treat climate change as the weather-and thereby
sever our discourse about it from the designation of responsible parties-
may explain the wild popularity of tradable permit ("cap and trade") pro-
grams as proposed legislative solutions. In more than four decades of
environmental law, the United States Congress has mandated only one
national cap and trade program for pollutants-the sulfur dioxide trading
regime initiated in Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.12
However, as far as I have been able to ascertain, every significant na-
tional legislative proposal to deal with climate change is built around a
cap and trade system. Others, including Al Gore in his Nobel Lecture in
December 2007,13 have compared the effectiveness of cap and trade sys-
tems with the effectiveness of carbon tax proposals (and found carbon
tax proposals superior).14 I am interested in the designation of responsi-
ble parties. In my frame of reference, tradable permit schemes are sig-
nificant primarily as a symptom of our desire to avoid designating re-
sponsible parties.
Among political structures in the United States, it is the states 5 that
have been willing to start the inquiry into what to do about the climate
crisis with the process of identifying responsible parties) 6 In public nui-
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (West 2008) (establishing the sulfur dioxide trading program). See
generally Peter Berck & Gloria E. Helfand, The Case of Markets Versus Standards for Pollution
Policy, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 345 (2005) (discussing the sulfur dioxide permitting process insti-
tuted by Title IV of the Clean Air Act); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the
Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352 (1999)
(examining the context and effectiveness of the Title IV legislation).
13. Al Gore, Nobel Lecture, Oslo (Dec. 10, 2007), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lecture-en.html ("And most important
of all, we need to put a price on carbon-with a C0 2 tax that is then rebated back to the people,
progressively, according to the laws of each nation, in ways that shift the burden of taxation from
employment to pollution. This is by far the most effective and simplest way to accelerate solutions
to this crisis.") (emphasis added).
14. Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
411,454-60 (2007).
15. According to the magnificent climate change litigation chart prepared by Arnold & Porter
under the direction of Michael Gerrand, there also have been two instances of common law tort
litigation involving climate change. The two cases, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
436 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (dismissed August, 2007) (appeal pending) and Korsinsky v. EPA, 2005 WL
2414744 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissed), aff'd 2006 WL 2255110 (2d Cir. 2006), were summarily
dismissed. See html:http://www.amoldporter.com/resources/documents/Climate Change_ Litiga-
tionChart 123107.mht!ClimateChangeLitigation Chart 123107_files/slide0004.htm.
16. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/judges.nsf/61fffe74f99516d088256d480060b72d/61c396eab91-
211868825735900798cf7/$FILE/5755orderdism.pdf (dismissing plaintiff's public nuisance claim
for damages against automobile manufacturers which generate huge volumes of greenhouse gas
emissions and allegedly contribute to global warming); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.
Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing public nuisance suits filed by the states of Connecticut,
New York, California, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, as well as the City
of New York and non-profit land trusts against electric utility companies seeking that the companies
abate their emission of greenhouse gases because of the gases' contribution to global warming).
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sance suits brought by a variety of states, most notably Connecticut and
California, plaintiffs have alleged the existence of specific classes of
responsible parties. To date, these cases have been dismissed in federal
court in deference to past and future federal legislative processes which
offer little or no promise of designating responsible parties. This is un-
fortunate. If allowed to proceed, the fact-finding process these suits
would require could inform decision making at every level of govern-
ment. The current gestational process regarding our national response to
the climate crisis needs to incorporate the states' responsible party analy-
sis into the policymaking process.
I. WHAT'S A LAWYER TO Do?
I have wondered about my role in fashioning a response to the ap-
proaching climate crisis. The literature I dutifully read seems unevenly
divided between: (1) statements of the need for radical global reductions
of greenhouse gas emissions based on dire predictions generated by fan-
tastically complex computer models; 17 (2) assessments of mind-
bendingly advanced technologies which may (or may not) be part of a
solution but which always require twenty minutes (and a diagram) to
explain;' 8 and (3) economic analyses proving beyond any doubt that all
the wonderful technologies may not be cost effective but that solving the
problem is. 19
My role as a citizen is fairly straightforward. As a matter of per-
sonal choice, I do what Al Gore tells me to do: Endeavor to reduce my
personal carbon footprint and vote for candidates who are willing to ad-
mit the problem exists and willing to do something about it.
Someday there will be rules-a very complex set of rules by all in-
dications. We lawyers will be able to battle over their meaning and ap-
plication ("Mr. Brown invested $50,000 in carbon credits under the as-
sumption that. . . ."). Right now, however, in the essential gestational
phase of what promises to be one of the most significant social-legal
regulatory structures in at least a generation, what are we good for?
17. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent-reviews/stem review economics
climate change/stem review report.cfm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008); UK- METEOROLOGICAL
OFFICE, HADLEY CENTRE CLIMATE MODELS, available at
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/hadleycentre/models/modeltypes.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2008) [hereinafter OFFICE]; INT'L INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REPORTS,
available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.org [hereinafter PANEL].
18. See, e.g., Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: Is There a Better Strategy than
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2007) (proposing that the
optimum means of addressing climate change problems is to decrease radiation by "adding particles
optimized for this purpose to the stratosphere to scatter a small portion of the incoming sunlight back
into space" and also to reduce acidification in the ocean).
19. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 17.
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What do most of us know about liquefied carbon dioxide,2° oceanic
acidification, 21 or global dimming?
22
My question is-of course-rhetorical. It is rhetorical both in the
sense that I think I already have an answer and rhetorical in the sense that
it sets up the point I am trying to make. I think we have a lot to add at
this stage, and I think we have not been doing our job.
II. THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE)
Before I can explain the role we lawyers should play, there is a nec-
essary preliminary step: a reorientation. Rather than applying legal
analysis to scientific or political formulations about the climate crisis, I
think we can (and must) reformulate the problem in traditional legal
terms. This I will now-modestly-attempt to do.
First, if the scientists are right, climate instability poses the greatest
threat to the global ecosystem, human liberty, private property, and "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations' 23 over the next few centuries.
In 2007, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in re-
sponse to a petition from the Center for Biological Diversity, published a
proposed rule to list the Polar Bear as a threatened species under the En-
dangered Species Act.24  It did this not because the species was being
hunted, or because humans were occupying more of its habitat, but be-
cause of "the [potential] decrease of sea ice coverage., 25 The proposed
rule explained that:
Although some [polar bear] females use snow dens on land for birth-
ing cubs, polar bears are almost completely dependent upon sea ice
for their sustenance. Any significant changes in the abundance, dis-
tribution, or existence of sea ice will have effects on the number and
behavior of these animals and their prey.
26
Although well buried in the proposed rule, FWS admits:
20. See David G. Hawkins, Daniel A. Lashof & Robert H. Williams, What to Do About Coal,
SC. AM., Sept. 2006, at 68-75 (discussing geologic carbon sequestration during coal processing).
21. See generally GERMAN ADVISORY ON GLOBAL CHANGE (WBGU), THE FUTURE
OCEANS-WARMING UP, RISING HIGH, TURNING SOUR, SPECIAL REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgusn2006 en.pdf; THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, OCEAN
ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASED ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE, Policy Doc. 12/05 (June
2005), available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id= 13539.
22. See Gerald Stanhill & Shebtai Cohen, Global Dimming: A Review of the Evidence for a
Widespread and Significant Reduction in Global Radiation with Discussion of Its Probable Causes
and Possible Agricultural Consequences, AGRIC. & FOREST METEOROLOGY, Apr. 2001, at 255
(discussing the possible causes, effects, and need for future research regarding the reduced levels of
solar radiation that are reaching the surface of the earth).
23. Penn-Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
24. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service-Alaska, Proposal to List the Polar Bear as Threatened
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Climate trends are not occurring evenly or in a linear fashion
throughout the world; Arctic regions are being disproportionately af-
fected by higher levels of warming. . . . Observations of Arctic
changes, including diminishing sea ice, shrinking glaciers, thawing
permafrost, and Arctic greening, validate earlier findings....
[P]revious projections regarding the rate and extent of climate change
underestimated the temperature trend, reductions to annual sea ice
during the summer and winter periods, reductions to multi-year pack
ice, and reductions in thickness ... indicated that the Arctic is mov-
ing toward a new "super interglacial" state that falls outside of natu-
ral glacial-interglacial periods that have characterized the past
800,000 years.... There is no paleoclimatic evidence for a season-
ally ice-free Arctic during the past 800,000 years.
27
As FWS makes clear, the costs of the climate crisis will not be
evenly distributed. Scientists all over the world have documented the
potential damage to ecosystems, not just in the Arctic but also in warmer
climes. In April 2007, the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change predicted "widening droughts in southern Europe and
the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, the American Southwest and Mex-
ico, and flooding that could imperil low-lying islands and the crowded
river deltas of southern Asia.,
28
The damage will affect more than ecosystems. In their letter in Na-
ture in 2005, prominent Indian scientists Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir
Chella Rajan identified one of the "ironies" of climate change 29 as the
probability that "although wealthy countries are responsible for most of
the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, they will ... face
less damage than poor countries., 3 ° Many of the areas of the globe that
are projected to be most affected by the climate crisis are also home to
the poorest human populations.
No lawyer who represents underprivileged human communities-in
the Arctic, in the tropics or elsewhere--can imagine for a moment that
his or her clients will be spared the brunt in the social reshuffling that
"adaptation" to the climate crisis will require. Arguably, the climate
crisis is already having an effect on the immigration debate in Europe
and the United States, and the politics are not encouraging. Nicholas
Stem's The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review estimates
that by the middle of the twenty-first century, 150 to 200 million people
27. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1071 (Jan. 9, 2007)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), available at http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/
pdf/Polarbear_proposed rule.pdf.
28. James Kanter & Andrew C. Revkin, Scientists Detail Climate Changes, Poles to Tropics,
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at Al.
29. Sujatha Byravan & Sudhir Chella Rajan, Immigration Could Ease Climate-Change Im-
pact, NATURE, Mar. 24, 2005, at 435.
30. Id.
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may have become permanently displaced by climate change. 3 The pros-
pect of the legal institutions we may create to control the 200 million
refugees projected to result from unchecked climate instability chills the
blood.
At the same time, the climate crisis will do what the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution forbids: It will "take" property,
both by physical invasion (e.g., floods and mudslides) and by depriving
owners of all reasonable use of their property. It will also take property
without compensation. The Stern Review estimates that a continuation of
"business as usual" will result in an average reduction in global per cap-
ita consumption of a minimum of 5.5 percent by 2200.32 According to
The Stern Review, adding the reduction of measurable per capita con-
sumption to the estimated costs of direct impacts on human health and
the environment ("non-market" impacts) increases that cost to 13.8 per-
cent of per capita consumption. 33 Adding these estimates to the pro-
jected costs of amplifying feedback loops and the disproportionate share
of the burden falling on developing countries less well positioned to
adapt leads The Stern Review to estimate a 24.4 percent reduction in cur-
rent per capita consumption, 34 "now and forever." Whether a five per-
cent or a 24 percent reduction, the projected multi-trillion dollar reduc-
tions in global consumption estimated in The Stern Review signify some-
thing like the collapse of civilization. A lot of things just will not be
worth what they used to be. A lot of property will not be worth anything
at all.
Addressing the problem immediately and effectively does not make
issues of cost and responsibility evaporate. If the Stern economists are
right, addressing the problem (and thereby protecting, to the degree pos-
sible, those rights we hold dear) will also be expensive. The Stern Re-
view indicates that aggressively addressing climate change will be cost
effective-averting between a five percent and 24 percent loss in global
consumption-at the cost of only about one percent world Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) annually.35 A good bargain, surely. Still, one percent
of the roughly 48 trillion dollar current annual global GDP36 is a little
under 500 billion dollars a year. That is roughly what the war in Iraq has
cost the United States so far.37 Who should pay that cost?
31. STERN, supra note 17, at 77.
32. Id. at 144.
33. Id. at 155-56.
34. Id. at 144.
35. Id. at 249.
36. WORLD BANK, TOTAL GDP 2006 4 (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
37. NATIONAL PRIORITIES PROJECT, THE WAR IN IRAQ COSTS, http://www.nationalpriorities.
org/costofwar home (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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The costs of the climate crisis-be they the costs of climate instabil-
ity or the costs of averting climate instability and most probably both-
will initially be borne by a variety of people who, through no fault of
their own, find their islands underwater, 38 their farms too parched to
yield a crop, 39 their city neighborhoods repeatedly battered by hurri-
canes, 40 their prime Florida condominium development sites turned into
wetlands,4' or their planned coal fired power plants delayed or stopped.42
Should these victims of the human-caused climate crisis be forced to
bear these catastrophes without compensation? If they are entitled to
compensation, from whom should they seek it?
As Professor Farber puts it:
In a country whose political process is only now awakening to the re-
ality of the climate change issue, it may seem almost utopian to
worry about compensation. Current litigation is likely to attract more
attention to the issue, as will some current endorsements of the idea
in international law. If the issue is not in the forefront today, it seems
safe to predict that it will be soon.43
So the climate crisis is, after all, a constellation of very familiar
kinds of legal problems. It is about avoiding harms, protecting rights and
expectations, marshaling resources to fix a problem, and compensating
those injured by the conduct of others. It is about justice. Lawyers,
breathe a sigh of relief. We are back on solid ground.
38. Tuiloma Neroni Slade, The Making of International Law: The Role of Small Island
States, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 531, 531, 540 (2003) (discussing the vulnerability of small
island nations to climate change, citing rising sea levels as the "most critical threat" from climate
change and referencing Maldives President Gayoom's 1987 statement to the U.N. General Assembly
that unless the international community takes steps to mitigate climate change, it would prove to be
'the death of [Maldives].'").
39. Richard A. Kerr, Warming Indian Ocean Wringing Moisture from the Sahel, SCIENCE,
Oct. 10, 2003, at 210 (suggesting that severe drought in the Sahel may be the result of climate
change increasing the temperature of the Indian Ocean).
40. P.J. Webster, G.J. Holland, J.A. Curry & H.R. Chang, Changes in Tropical Cyclone
Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment, SCIENCE, Sept. 16, 2005, at 1844
(noting a possible correlation between global climate change and increased hurricane characteristics
in the North Atlantic region); Kevin Trenberth, Uncertainty in Hurricanes and Global Warming,
SCIENCE, June 17, 2005, at 1753 (discussing factors contributing to an increase in hurricanes in the
North Atlantic during the last decade).
41. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP II FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT 100 (2007), http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/pages-media/FAR4docs/
finalpdfsar4/Chapter0 I.pdf (projecting a rise in sea level due to climate change); Lester R. Brown,
Rising Sea Level Forcing Evacuation of Island Country, EARTH POL'Y INST., Nov. 15, 2001,
http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/Update2_printable.htm (noting that the projected rise in sea
level threatens Florida beachfront properties to the extent that such properties "are becoming unin-
surable.").
42. John Hanna, John Milburn & Carl Manning, Kansas Regulator Rejects New Power
Plants, CBS NEWS/ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2007/10/19/tech/main3387356.shtml?source=search story (discussing Kansas' "Secretary of Health
and Environment" Ron Benby's decision to reject air permits for two new coal-fired power plants
because of the plants' greenhouse gas emissions).
43. Daniel A. Farber, Responses to Global Warming: The Law, Economics, and Science of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1608 (2007).
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III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS (IN THEORY)
From a traditional lawyer's point of view, one of the keys to an-
swering the now familiarly formulated questions regarding our response
to the climate crisis turns on the meaning of a single word-
responsibility. Responsibility is a word at the heart of our legal tradition.
The climate crisis is not just bad weather-it is a human-caused
thing44 like a car accident, a polluted lake, or a bankrupt company.
When we deal with human-caused crises-be it the Exxon Valdez oil
spill or the Enron collapse--our first questions address: (1) who is going
to pay the necessary response costs; (2) who has been injured; and (3)
how and if we can redress those injuries. Sometimes, we agree that those
costs should be borne by the injured themselves, and sometimes we de-
termine that the injuries be redressed by society at large, but more often
than not we identify responsible parties and get them to pay. Taken from
another point of view, the question is: Who should we designate as re-
sponsible in order to avoid similar future harms and reset the "moral bal-
ance" through "corrective justice"? Generally, we make people we des-
ignate responsible pay damages. Even when we do not make them pay,
or do not make them pay the full cost of compensation, we let them
know their conduct is unacceptable, in order to discourage them and oth-
ers like them from doing it in the future.
Responsibility does not necessarily mean fault. It just means re-
sponsibility. To illuminate slightly, let us consider four relevant types of
responsibility. We can even diagram them in two sets-responsibility
for past action and responsibility for future action as opposed to respon-
sibility to pay and responsibility to do (or not do).
44. See PANEL, supra note 17; OFFICE, supra note 17; GABRIELE C. HEGERL ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING AND ATTRIBUTING CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS 663, 665-66 (David J. Karoly et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), available at
http://ipcc-wgl.ucar.edu/wgl/Report/AR4WGlPrint Ch09.pdf (providing a scientific examination
of the likelihood that humans have induced climate change).
Action for the Past-) Responsibility to Act (or Re-
Responsibility to frain from Acting) to Remedy Existing Problems
Act
Action for the Future-) Responsibility to Act (or




Payment for the Past-) Responsibility to Pay to
Responsibility to Remedy Existing Problems.
Pay
Payment for the Future-) Responsibility to Pay to
Prevent/Mitigate Future Problems
So, for example, in the "Action for the Past" box, we might place
the Endangered Species Act take prohibition, which prevents anyone
from engaging in an action that will injure members of a particular spe-
cies of "fish or wildlife," not because each animal is inherently valuable
but because past conduct has pushed that species to the brink of extinc-
tion.a5 Someday, according to the Fourth Circuit in Gibbs v. Babbitt, we
may again be able to hunt red wolves, but we cannot hunt them now be-
cause there is only a handful left.46 We are all, in theory, responsible to
refrain from such conduct, but the burden falls disproportionately on
farmers and ranchers who might want to kill red wolves to protect live-
stock. They are responsible in a way the rest of us are not.
In the "Action for the Future" box we can place classic off-street
parking requirements.4 7 Under the zoning codes of most American cit-
ies, if you undertake a land use, you are obligated to provide sufficient
off-street parking to support it. Many of us who have strayed into the
world of parking regulation have been amazed by the simplicity of off-
street parking mandates. In many cities, they are little more than a blunt
statement that the user of a piece of land is responsible for providing the
off-street parking his or her activity requires. 48 Still, these generic state-
ments of responsibility have resulted in the investment of tens of billions
of dollars in parking lots and structures.49
In the "Payment for the Past" box, we can place CERCLA-type ret-
roactive owner and operator responsibility-the obligation to pay money
to clean up releases of hazardous substances that have already taken
place. Absent a very narrow range of defenses, the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Compensation, Response and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)50 renders all "owners and operators",51 of lands contaminated
45. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a) (West 2008).
46. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 498 (4th Cir. 2000).
47. See generally DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING (APA Planners
Press 2004).
48. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., DENVER ZONING CODE art. VI, § 59-582 (2008).
49. Keith Bawolek, What Drives Parking Investments, COM. INV. REAL EST., April 2004,
available at http://www.ciremagazine.com/article.php?article id=66 (noting that the parking indus-
try gets over 20 billion dollars in parking revenues each year).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 2002) (providing statutory defenses that preclude CERCLA
liability).
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with "hazardous substances" responsible for the costs of clean up.52 Fa-
mously, CERCLA liability is not based on knowledge of wrongdoing or
the illegality of any act at the time it was committed. Liability is limited
to "response costs.
53
In the "Payment for the Future" box we can place local "develop-
ment impact fees"-the obligation to pay money to mitigate conditions
that will result from a development as yet un-built.54 When developers
pay development fees in order to receive approval for a development
from a local land use authority, what they pay is supposed to approxi-
mate the burden their development will impose on the jurisdiction grant-
ing approval and receiving the fee.
These categories are imperfect, but I think you will find them handy
because, if you keep them in mind, you will discover that many current
proposed responses to the climate crisis avoid holding anyone responsi-
ble for the problem in any of these four ways.
According to the synthesis report of the International Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) in 2007, there are now measurable changes in the
world climate. The damage caused by the climate crisis is both in the
past and in the future. In the scientific/bureaucratic jargon of the IPCC:
"Of the 29,000 observational data series, from 75 studies that show sig-
nificant change in many biological systems, more than 89 percent are
consistent with the direction of change expected as a response to warm-
ing.",55 These changes can be traced to emissions of greenhouse gases
(most significantly carbon dioxide) dating back to the beginning of the
industrial revolution.
5 6
The climate crisis has deep roots. However, greenhouse gas emis-
sions are not like slavery and child labor (in the developed world): We
cannot simply blame them on the dead. Annual emissions of greenhouse
gases increased 70 percent between 1970 and 2004. 57 There are enti-
ties-major greenhouse gas emitters-around right now that we can hold
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 2002) (defining "'owner or operator' for the purposes
of CERCLA).
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West 2008).
53. Kenneth P. Dobson, Methods and Motives for Imposing Strict Liability on Parties Hiring
Independent Contractors to Transport Hazardous Materials in the State of Florida, 24 VT. L. REV.
1297, 1301 (2000) (explaining that "CERCLA's strict liability covers only 'response costs,"' holding
former and current facility owners or operators liable for releasing hazardous substances into the
environment); Kurt M. Brauer, Acushnet Company v. Coaters, Inc.: Defining the Role of Causation
for CERCLA Response Cost Liability, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1465, 1466 (1998) (explaining that
CERCLA is a "strict liability" statute that allows parties to recover response costs for "releases, or
threatened releases, of hazardous substances").
54. See DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION (J. Bart Johnson &
James van Hemert eds., The Rocky Mountain Land Use inst. 2006).
55. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:





responsible for a significant portion of the current stock of greenhouse
gases. Using our "Payment for the Past" CERCLA responsibility model,
we could make them pay to mitigate past emissions. Using our "Action
for the Past" Endangered Species Act responsibility model we can make
them modify their conduct to avoid making existing problems worse.
The greenhouse gas emissions problem is projected to get much
worse. The IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (2000) projects
an increase of greenhouse gas emissions of between 25 and 90 percent
between 2000 and 2030. 58 There are entities around today that we can
hold responsible for those projected emissions. Using our "Payment for
the Future" development fees responsibility model, we can make them
pay money to mitigate the impact of their future emissions. Using our
"Action for the Future" off-street parking responsibility model we can
make them do things to reduce and offset their future emissions.
But should anyone be held responsible for the climate crisis? After
all, are we not all responsible? In the past few hours I have vented both
carbon dioxide and methane. Have my emissions been offset by my of-
fice plants? While we all may be nominally responsible, some actors in
society are far more responsible than others. Imposing legal responsibil-
ity on them is far, far easier, morally and politically.
Even if justice does not interest us, the designation of responsible
parties is still necessary to fashion effective remedial mechanisms. A
simple hypothetical should illustrate this point.
In 2004, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
released a national greenhouse gas inventory. Carbon dioxide consti-
tuted 84.6 percent of greenhouse gases emitted in the United States.
59
The inventory lumps the vast majority of United States carbon dioxide
emissions (almost 95 percent) in one category, fossil fuel combustion.
60
The inventory then divides fossil fuel combustion by sector. Transporta-
tion and electrical generation are by far the two largest sectors, with in-
dustry coming in a distant third.61 The bulk of greenhouse gas emissions
in a developed country like the United States come from energy genera-
tion and transportation. While these sectors play a smaller role in the
global inventory,62 they are still significant.
Now imagine it were otherwise. Imagine that the primary source of
greenhouse gases in the United States was meat eating. In fact, meat
58. Id. at 7.
59. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2006 21 (2007).
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id at 25.
62. For 2004, the IPCC divides the sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions glob-
ally into sections: Energy Supply (25.9 percent), Industry (19.4 percent), Forestry (including defor-
estation) (17.4 percent), Agriculture (13.5 percent), Transport (13.1 percent), Residential and Com-
mercial Buildings (7.9 percent), and Waste (2.8 percent). IPCC, supra note 55.
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eating is a source when you consider the indirect costs of raising, slaugh-
tering, and transporting cattle, and transporting and refrigerating meat.
In 2007, Britain's prestigious medical journal The Lancet reported that a
reduction in global meat consumption would slow climate change.63
This hypothetical is not far fetched. Still, it is a hypothetical.
If the primary cause of climate change were carnivory, would we
approach the problem in the same way? Would a "cap and trade" system
seem as appealing? Might a tax seem more attractive? How about an
outright ban? I cannot tell you what your response to carnivory-caused
climate change would be, but I am confident that it would be different
than your response to climate change caused by vehicles and electric
utilities.
What causes climate change, who is doing it, and what they can do
about it must be near the foundation of any effective system to identify
mechanisms to spread that cost equitably among those responsible par-
ties, and identify measures to reduce those costs to the degree possible.
Who should be held responsible for greenhouse gas emissions from
transportation and energy generation? Following the tenets of our envi-
ronmental law tradition, the answer is energy generators and vehicle
manufacturers. In 1970, in the Clean Air Act, we, as a nation, decided
that air pollution was not everyone's responsibility, but rather the re-
sponsibility of major emitters of relevant air pollutants; they would be
subjected to the now dreaded "command and control" requirements of
that pioneering effort of environmental legislation. At the same time and
in the same law, we decided that the manufacturers of motor vehicles
should be held responsible for the emissions from the vehicles they
manufactured and subjected to "command and control" standards. 64 Tra-
ditional air pollution is a "flow problem":65 unlike greenhouse gases,
traditional air pollutants do not accumulate over long periods of time so
it does not matter what you emitted last week-just what you emit to-
day.66 As a result, the Clean Air Act subjected these two classes of par-
ties to a form of responsibility akin to the "Action for the Future" off-
street parking requirement-box two in our handy chart. They were not
required to pay anything, directly. They were required to modify their
63. Maria Cheng, Eating Less Meat May Slow Climate Change, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK,
Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.enn.com/pollution/article/2301 1.
64. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 70-71 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 2004) (discussing the implications of the Clean Air Act for the automotive industry).
65. SCHLUMBERGER EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND ENERGY: STOCK AND FLOW,
http://www.seed.slb.com/en/scictr/watch/climate change/stock.htm (last visited March 26, 2008).
66. ARNOLD W. REITZE JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT
411 (Envtl. Law Inst. 2001) (noting that greenhouse gases are unlike many other pollutants because
efficient combustion does not prevent greenhouse gas formation); see also id. at 12-39 (providing a
legal history of the Clean Air Act).
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manufacturing processes to reduce emissions both from the processes
themselves and from the products they manufactured.
These choices turned out to be wise. Air pollution regulation in the
United States has been effective. According to EPA's 2003 "Draft Re-
port on the Environment," between 1970 and 2001, while the United
States Gross Domestic Product increased 161 percent, emissions of the
six regulated "criteria" air pollutants (lead, particulates, nitrous oxides,
sulfur dioxide, ozone, and carbon monoxide) decreased 25 percent.
67
The choices have also been cost effective. Section 812 of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 requires EPA to periodically assess the
effect of the Clean Air Act on the "public health, economy and environ-
ment of the United States. 68 In 1997, EPA generated its first such re-
port: The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990. The
Report found the total monetized benefits of the Clean Air Act during
that 20 year period to be between 5.6 and 49.4 trillion dollars with a cen-
tral estimate of 22.2 trillion dollars.69 The report found the total direct
compliance expenditures (imposed on responsible parties) to be 0.5 tril-
lion dollars. 70 In 1999, EPA prepared a second report entitled The Bene-
fits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990 to 2010. This new report esti-
mated a cost-benefit ratio of one to four.7'
Rendering this limited group of entities responsible has encouraged
innovation, limited economic dislocation, and offended few people's
moral sensibilities. It has not, however, made those designated responsi-
ble parties happy.
IV. AVOIDING DESIGNATING RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR THE CLIMATE
CRISIS (IN PRACTICE)
When it comes to legislating about the climate crisis, our federal
elected officials (overwhelmingly lawyers) appear to leave their tradi-
tional legal thinking at home and act more like the bit part players in a
disaster movie.
According to Professor Victor Flatt, as of October 17, 2007, there
were at least ten legislative proposals in Congress to address climate
67. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 2003, at ii, 1-3 (2003),
available at http://www.epa.gov/indicate/roe/html/roePDF.htm.
68. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2691 (1990) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 7612 (2006)).
69. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO
1990, at ES-8 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1970-1990/812exec2.pdf.
70. Id.
71. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1990 TO
2010, at iii (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/chapl 130.pdf.
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change-all proposed "cap and trade" approaches.72 I will mention only
a few representative examples.
The most prominent piece of proposed climate change legislation
currently before Congress is Senator Joseph Lieberman and Senator John
Warner's "America's Climate Security Act of 2007" (S. 2191)-
approved by the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee on
December 5, 2007. The bill, characterized on Senator Lieberman's web-
site as creating "an economy-wide cap and trade program that provides
maximum flexibility for the marketplace to meet a level of emission re-
ductions that is environmentally credible," 73 goes to some lengths to
avoid designating anyone responsible for greenhouse gas emissions.
While the bill's Section 2 "findings" declare that "prompt, decisive
action is critical" and that "it is possible and desirable to cap greenhouse
gas emissions," it never actually states that greenhouse gas emissions are
the cause of climate change.74 The closest the bill comes to acknowledg-
ing this causal connection is in its Section 3 "Purposes," in which it de-
clares that the purpose of the Act is to "establish the core of a Federal
program that will reduce United States greenhouse gas emissions sub-
stantially enough between 2007 and 2050 to avert the catastrophic im-
pacts of global climate change. 75
The bulk of the 214 page bill describes a mind-numbingly complex
allowance trading system whereby greenhouse gas emitters trade "emis-
sion allowances" under slowly lowering emission allowance caps. In a
"cap and trade" system, the primary opportunity for identifying any
group of emitters as actually responsible for the projected climate catas-
trophe is in the allocation of emission allowances. If emitters were re-
quired to pay-prospectively and proportionally-for the right to push us
all closer to the brink of catastrophic climate instability, then we would,
at least, have a form of responsibility akin to "Payment for the Future" or
development impact fees.
A responsibility analysis would suggest that the cost of emission al-
lowances is dictated by the cost of eliminating or adapting to the conse-
quences of those emissions. In fact, the Lieberman-Warner bill offers no
link between the costs of emission allowances and the cost of responding
to the consequences of those emissions. This absence of connection be-
tween the regulatory burden and the prospective costs of climate change
is the primary missing link in the responsibility designation.
72. Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change
Legislative Proposal Is "Best"?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 123, 135 (2007), available at
http://colloquy.law.northwestem.edu/main/2007/12/taking-the-legi.htmi.
73. Website of Senator Joe Lieberman of Conn., Climate Change,
http://lieberman.senate.gov/issues/globalwarming.cfm (last visited March 26, 2008).
74. America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 2(2), (4) (2007).
75. Id. § 3(1).
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The primary identification of who is affected by the legislation ap-
pears in the bill's definition of "covered facility," which includes large
fossil fuel fired electric generating units, large industrial carbon dioxide
emitters, major producers and importers of coal or petroleum-based
transportation fuel, and producers and importers of chemicals that emit
large quantities of greenhouse gases.76 This seems a promising list. It
includes most of the major sources of greenhouse gases in the United
States.
Section 1202 of the bill bears the promising title: "Compliance Ob-
ligation., 77 The section requires the owner or operator of a "covered
facility" to submit to EPA emission allowances, or a variety of other
rough equivalents, to cover greenhouse gas emissions for the previous
78year. But how do "covered facilities" get these emission allowances?
The bill grants 12 percent of "emission allowances" free of charge to
covered facilities on the basis of past emissions (rewarding past bad con-
duct) and allocates the rest (by shifting formula) to states, Indian tribes,
and a newly created Climate Change Credit Corporation to auction off.
79
Referring back to our handy chart, the Lieberman-Warner cap and
trade system does not require potentially responsible parties (admirably
identified in the definition of "covered facilities") to do anything to rem-
edy past or prevent/mitigate future problems. They can continue to emit
greenhouse gases. Eventually, the bill would require that they pay some-
thing for the right to emit. But the connection between that payment and
any remedy for an existing problem or solution to a future problem is
tenuous. While not a complete subsidy for emitters, the structure-
through its complexity if nothing else-avoids making a significant des-
ignation of responsibility.
Representative Henry Waxman's bill, H.R. 1590, the "Safe Climate
Act of 2007," introduced on March 20, 2007, is more forthright and one
tenth as long. Waxman's findings state that "decisive action is needed to
minimize the many dangers posed by global warming" and that "with
only 5 percent of the world population, the United States emits approxi-
mately 20 percent of the world's total greenhouse gas emissions and
must be a leader in addressing global warming., 80 Waxman's bill spe-
cifically requires that emission "allowances" be issued through auctions
in most cases.81 Still, Waxman's bill is largely bereft of language indi-
cating responsibility for climate change or the causal link between cli-
76. Id. § 4(7).
77. Id. § 1202.
78. Id. § 1202(a).
79. Id. § 3301; see Website of Senator Joe Lieberman of Conn., S. 2191 Emission Allowance
Allocation Table, http://lieberman.senate.gov/documents/acsaemission.pdf (last visited March 26,
2008).
80. Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(7) (2007).
81. Id. § 704(a), (d)(1)(A).
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mate change and greenhouse gas emissions. Again, there is no explicit
relationship between the costs of emission allowances and the projected
costs of responding to the consequences of those emissions.
Another approach to responsibility appears in Senator Diane Fein-
stein's "Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007" (S. 317). Senator
Feinstein's bill deals explicitly with the electric utility industry, defining
an "affected unit" as "an electric generating facility. 82 The bill regulates
emissions from that group of potentially responsible parties alone. Am-
biguity arises from the fact that it is not clear what others groups of re-
sponsible parties would be subject to similar treatment. As Professor
Victor Flatt puts it:
The difficulty with cap-and-trade enforcement may be why two of
the proposals (Feinstein-Carper and Alexander-Lieberman) only ap-
ply to the electricity sector. It has already been demonstrated that
this sector can be efficiently regulated in a cap-and-trade system.
However, limiting the law to this one sector means that overall emis-
sions reductions cannot be as large. Moreover, it raises fairness con-
cers .... [These proposals] could be seen as compromise proposals
that anticipate further legislation in other sectors .... 83
The process in the international sphere is also remarkably free of
meaningful responsible party designations. While the responsibility of
developed world nations for the projected climate crisis affects every
aspect of the negotiations, the negotiated documents do not address re-
sponsibility directly.
The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change designates 36
Annex I nations deemed "developed" and subject to more obligations in
responding to climate change. 84 The nature of those obligations, how-
ever, is diffuse and the basis for the obligations is largely unstated. To
the degree that the document deals with the basis of the developed
world's obligation, it implies something more akin to noblesse oblige
than responsibility:
Each of these [Annex I] Parties shall adopt national ... policies and
take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protect-
ing and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These
policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are
taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic
emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recogniz-
ing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
82. Elec. Util. Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. § 701(l) (2007).
83. Flatt, supra note 72, at 137-38 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
84. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 6-
7,23 (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/not assigned/b/items/1417.php.
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gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to
such modification, and taking into account the differences in these
Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures and re-
source bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic
growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as
well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each
of these Parties to the global effort regarding that objective.
85
The much discussed 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change is also based on an implicit,
but unstated, notion of responsibility. Forty-one Annex I nations, devel-
oped countries in Europe and North America with the exception of Aus-
tralia, Japan, New Zealand, bind themselves to meet specific greenhouse
gas emissions targets.86 The other nations of the world have no specific
emission limitation obligations. The imposition of specific obligations
on only 41 countries has been justified in terms of their historic responsi-
bility for the currently high levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
and also on the fact they contain the lion's share of the world's techno-
logical economy and therefore emit the lion's share of the world's green-
house gases. China and India's exclusion from the Annex I nations, in
the absence of any statement about responsibility-prospective or retro-
spective-has provided the United States with an excuse to avoid ratify-
ing the Kyoto Protocol.87
The documents adopted as part of the "Bali Roadmap" and "Action
Plan" after the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali in
December 2007, seem, if possible, a retreat from the idea of designating
responsible parties.
Perhaps the strongest statement of "differentiated responsibilities"
appears in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
The First Ten Years:
The Convention laid down the foundation for these policies by both
developing and developed countries, recognizing their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Although
the most immediate responsibility for cutting greenhouse gas emis-
sions lies with the richer and more industrialized countries, the de-
veloping countries too need to establish climate-friendly patterns of
85. Id. at 6.
86. See UNITED NATIONS, KYOTO PROTOCOL To THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 3, 20 (1998), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
87. David Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al ("Mr. Bush remained firm in rejecting the 1997 Kyoto accord, noting
that it set no standards for major emitters of greenhouse gases, like China and India, while creating
mandates for the United States that could prove economically crippling.").
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sustainable development for which they should also be able to rely on
bilateral and multilateral assistance.
88
V. THE STATES (IN LITIGATION) IDENTIFY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
The title of this article alludes to the interrelationship between juris-
dictions in responding to climate change. You may wonder, so far, what
this analysis has to do with the relationship among jurisdictions. The
answer, of course, is that while federal legislative solutions and interna-
tional processes have shied away from designating responsible parties for
climate change, litigation pursued by states has endeavored to designate
responsible parties and, to date, has failed.
In July 2004, the States of Connecticut, New York, California,
Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the City
of New York, filed suit against American Electric Power Company,
American Electric Power Service Corporation, the Southern Company,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, XCEL Energy and CINERGY alleging
claims of public nuisance under both federal and state law.89 The com-
plaint did not hesitate to designate responsible parties and set forth the
bases of their responsibility. The complaint alleged damages already
suffered and to be suffered in the foreseeable future:
Global warming already has begun to alter the climate of the United
States. The threatened injuries to the plaintiffs and their citizens and
residents from continued global warming include increased heat
deaths due to intensified and prolonged heat waves; increased
ground-level smog with concomitant increases in respiratory prob-
lems like asthma; beach erosion, inundation of coastal land, and
salinization of water supplies from accelerated sea level rise; reduc-
tion of the mountain snow pack in California that provides a critical
source of water for the State; lowered Great Lakes water levels,
which impairs commercial shipping, recreational harbors and mari-
nas, and hydropower generation; more droughts and floods, resulting
in property damage and hazard to human safety; and widespread loss
of species and biodiversity, including the disappearance of hardwood
forests from the northern United States.
90
The complaint then alleged who was responsible:
88. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE FIRST TEN YEARS 43 (2004), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/first-ten yearsen.pdf.
89. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see
also Andrew C. Revkin, New York City and 8 States Plan to Sue Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2004, at AS. A copy of the original complaint filed in the district court, Complaint, Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), is available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/jul/jul2Ia 04 attach.pdf.
90. Complaint, Am. Elec., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1-2.
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Defendants, by their annual emissions of approximately 650 million
tons of carbon dioxide, are substantial contributors to elevated levels
of carbon dioxide and global warming. Defendants are the five larg-
est emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States and are among the
largest in the world. Defendants' emissions constitute approximately
one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector's carbon dioxide emis-
sions and approximately ten percent of all carbon dioxide emissions
from human activities in the United States.
91
Finally, the complaint alleged how the responsible parties could
mitigate or eliminate the problem through their actions:
Defendants have available to them practical, feasible and economi-
cally viable options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions without
significantly increasing the cost of electricity to their customers.
These options include changing fuels, improving efficiency, increas-
ing generation from zero- or low-carbon energy sources such as
wind, solar, and gasified coal with emissions capture, co-firing wood
or other biomass in coal plants, employing demandside management
techniques, altering the dispatch order of their plants, and other
measures.
9 2
The complaint deftly sketches out the basis for legal responsibility:
the gravity of the threat, the injuries that can reasonably be expected to
result from it, the significance of the defendants' contribution to the
threat, and the defendants' capacity to mitigate if not eliminate the threat.
Lawyers were at work.
At the end of more than 50 pages of allegations, plaintiffs requested
an order to hold the defendants "jointly and severally liable for creating,
contributing to, and/or maintaining a public nuisance; [p]ermanently
enjoining each defendant to abate its contribution to the nuisance by re-
quiring it to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a
specified percentage each year for at least a decade" and, of course,
"such other relief as this Court deems just and proper."93 In essence, the
states requested that: (1) defendants be held liable for their past and fu-
ture conduct, roughly the equivalent of "Payment for the Past"
CERCLA-type liability for past emissions and "Payment for the Future"
development fees for future emissions; and (2) that defendants be or-
dered to refrain from some future conduct reasonably anticipated to make
the problem worse, roughly the equivalent of the "Action for the Past"
Endangered Species Act take prohibition. In other words, they de-
manded that the court hold the defendants responsible.
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 49.
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On September 20, 2006, the State of California filed suit against
General Motors, Toyota Motors North America, Ford Motor Company,
Honda North America, Chrysler Motors, and Nissan North America in
another public nuisance case. 94 Again, the plaintiff clearly alleged the
basis for liability. While setting forth in detail the actual and potential
damage to California's snowpack and coastline, the complaint alleged:
"Defendants, by their annual emissions in the United States of approxi-
mately 289 million metric tons of carbon dioxide are substantial con-
tributors-among the world's largest contributors-to global warming
and to the adverse impacts on California.,
95
The complaint also alleged that "[d]amages caused by global warm-
ing are cognizable, ongoing and increasing. Defendants are aware of the
impacts and have chosen to continue to produce products that generate
enormous quantities of carbon dioxide, to the detriment of California."
96
Again, the elements of the argument for legal responsibility are
clear: the gravity of the threat, the injuries that can reasonably be ex-
pected to result from it, the significance of the defendants' contribution
to the threat, and the defendants' capacity to mitigate, if not eliminate,
the threat.
In a significant departure from the Connecticut model, California
requested only that the court "[h]old each defendant jointly and severally
liable for creating, contributing to and maintaining a public nuisance"
and for "monetary damages according to proof., 97 California's allega-
tions limit responsibility to an obligation to pay, both for past and future
injury.
The strong statements of alleged responsibility embodied in these
two complaints were filed in federal district courts-in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York and Northern District of California. Had the litigation
been allowed to proceed, the courts would have developed a factual re-
cord to support (or contradict) the state's allegations. Both complaints,
however, were dismissed.
In September 2005, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York dismissed the Connecticut complaint on "po-
litical question" grounds in deference to the very modest legislative ac-
tion taken by the federal government to combat climate change at that
time.98 The court emphasized the need to leave the question to the "ac-
94. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2007) (order granting defendants' motion to dismiss).




98. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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countable" political branches of government. 99 "Because resolution of
the issues presented here requires identification and balancing of eco-
nomic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests,"
the court found that "a policy determination" was required. 10 The court
largely ignored the fact that plaintiffs represented the "political
branches" in eight states and the nation's largest city and that-in the
absence of federal action-those political entities had few other mecha-
nisms to discharge their political obligations to their constituents. More
significantly for our purposes, the court dismissed state claims offering a
theory of responsibility in favor of a barely identifiable federal policy
offering none.
The district court ruling in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 0 1 In September 2007, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California dismissed California's complaint on
similar grounds. The court dismissed on political question grounds,
again deferring to the limited legislation already enacted by Congress.
!0 2
The court went further, indicating that the United States Supreme Court's
grant of standing to state plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA0 3 somehow
required dismissal of state plaintiffs' claims in California v. General
Motors Corp.
104
Quoting the majority opinion in Massachusetts, the court argued
that the fact that "Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions" somehow deprives Massachu-
setts or California of the right to sue General Motors in federal court.1
0 5
The court argued that the Clean Air Act precluded California's suit:
"Underpinning the Supreme Court's standing analysis is the concept that
the authority to regulate carbon dioxide lies with the federal government,
and more specifically with the EPA as set forth in the [Clean Air
Act].' 0 6  The court avoided traditional preemption analysis to deprive
the State of its common law rights for the simple reason that the Clean
Air Act contains two broad "savings clauses" preserving state common
law jurisdiction 10 7 for all parties including, arguably, the United States,1
08
99. Id. at 267.
100. Id. at 274.
101. See Brief of Amici Curiae, U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe and the Washington Legal
Foundation in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Supporting Affirmance of the District Court,
Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 05-5104),
available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/Connecticut%20%20v.%20American%20Electric%20-
Power'/o20Compa ny,%201nc.pdf.
102. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *8-10, * 16.
103. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
104. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *10-13.
105. ld. at *11.
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7416, 7604(e) (West 2008).
108. United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215, 1220 (D. Mont. 1979).
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but almost certainly the states. In a remarkably creative justification for
dismissing a common law nuisance claim, the court declared:
Because the States have "surrendered" to the federal government
their right to engage in certain forms of regulations and therefore
may have standing in certain circumstances to challenge those regu-
lations, and because new automobile carbon dioxide emissions are
such a regulation expressly left to the federal government, a resolu-
tion of this case would thrust this Court beyond the bounds of justi-
ciability. 1
09
The district court ruling in California v. General Motors Corp. is
also on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. ' 10
Both the Connecticut and California courts rely on the third prong
in the traditional six-part Baker v. Carr"1 political question justiciability
test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1962: "the impos-
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.""1 2  As the California court put it:
"This factor largely controls the analysis in the current case due to the
complexity of the initial global warming policy determinations that must
be made by the elected branches prior to the proper adjudication of Plain-
tiff's federal common law nuisance claim." ' 13 As the Connecticut court
put it: "In this case, balancing those interests, together with the other
interests involved, is impossible without an 'initial policy determination'
first having been made by the elected branches to which our system
commits such policy decisions, viz., Congress and the President."
' 14
It is not entirely clear what "balancing of economic, environmental,
foreign policy, and national security interests" the courts would demand
from federal elected officials before they would be comfortable consider-
ing the existence and scope of defendants' responsibility for the damages
associated with climate change. What is clear is that they do not want to
be the first to determine who should be held responsible for the climate
crisis.
CONCLUSION
We could characterize the contrast between the federal legislative
proposals, based on emission trading and avoiding the designation of
responsible parties, and the state complaints in litigation, designating
109. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *12.
110. See Appellant's Opening Brief, California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 27226871
(9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-16908), available at http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/ninth-circuit-
brief.pdf.
111. 369 U.S. 186(1962).
112. Id. at 217.
113. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *6.
114. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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responsible parties, as either a conflict or a frustrated symbiotic relation-
ship. My natural optimism favors the second possibility. We need not
follow the example of the district court opinions in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power and California v. General Motors Corp. and
emphasize the potential conflicts between the litigation process initiated
in the state public nuisance cases and the legislative process going on in
Congress. Instead, we can emphasize how these two very different legal
processes might support each other. If the states, or other plaintiffs, are
ever able to sustain cases like the Connecticut and California public nui-
sance cases in court, they will develop factual records regarding the re-
sponsibility of the named defendants for the climate crisis. By doing so,
they could help us do the one thing both national legislative and interna-
tional quasi-legislative processes seem incapable of doing: they could
help us identify responsible parties.
If we are fortunate, the next stage in this gestational process toward
a regulatory scheme to deal with the climate crisis will involve both fo-
cusing on classes of responsible parties and identifying workable mecha-
nisms for dividing the costs of response to climate change among them.
For now, we can only hope.
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